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It is widely believed that higher education academic salaries are too low, and that this 
may lead to a ‘brain drain’ and also lower quality in higher education, as universities 
fail to attract the ‘brightest and the best’. We compare the salaries of Higher Education 
teaching professionals  in  the UK with those of  other  comparable  professionals.  We 
compare academic salaries to a range of occupational groupings that one might view as 
similar,  in  terms  of  unobserved characteristics,  to  academics.  We conclude  that  HE 
teaching professionals earn lower earnings than most public sector graduates and do 
particularly  poorly  compared  to  most  other  comparable  professionals.  In  particular, 
academic  earnings  compare  poorly  to  those  in  the  legal  professions,  consultant 
physicians and dental practitioners (across both the public and private sectors).  On the 
other hand, some public sector workers do worse than HE academics, e.g. FE teachers.
JEL classifications: I20 I23 I28 
1. Introduction
In recent years industrial action taken by the Association of University Teachers (AUT) has 
given the issue of academic pay high prominence in the UK press.1 Although agreement was 
reached between the unions and employers, the debate is set to continue since, despite a pay 
settlement, there still remains the issue of an apparently widening gap between academic and 
non-academic salaries.
There is a remarkable consensus amongst policy-makers and the media that higher 
education academic salaries are too low, both in international  terms and relative to other 
groups of  professional  workers  in  the UK. The UK government  White  Paper  on Higher 
Education (DfES, 2003a 2003b) cited pay as one of the major issues facing the HE sector and 
1 See for example The Guardian ‘Lecturers 'Barred' from Pay Talks Until Marking Ban Ends’, March 28th, 2006 
or The Telegraph ‘Pay Row Could Leave Final Exams Unmarked’, 3rd April 2006.
explicitly  acknowledged  the  relative  decline  in  academic  salaries  in  recent  years. 
Furthermore,  many  of  the  arguments  made  in  support  of  the  higher  education  financial 
reform package that  has  recently  been implemented  in  England,  are  underpinned  by the 
notion that  more  resources  need to be brought  into  the HE sector  (via  increased student 
contributions  and other  means)  to  fund HE salaries  at  a  competitive  level.  Certainly the 
media generally report that academic pay has been outstripped by earnings growth in other 
public sector occupations2. The evidence base for this view remains controversial however. 
(The Independent, ‘Academics are not so badly paid’, 6th April, 2006) and further research is 
sorely needed. 
So why does the pay of HE academics matter, from a policy perspective? Firstly,  
academic pay impacts directly on the quality of the higher education sector. The argument is 
that if policy makers do not address the problem of relative pay in academia, it may not be 
possible to maintain the high quality of the HE sector in the UK, with its strong international 
reputation.  There  is  certainly  empirical  evidence  to  support  this  view  of  a  positive 
relationship between relative pay and the quality of workers, in academia and in the public 
sector more generally (Nickell and Quintini, 2002; Boyle, 2006). A lower quality HE matters 
because the sector is an important one for the UK economy. It produces the education and 
skills that many argue are essential for continued economic growth and prosperity (Leitch, 
2006).  Even  more  directly,  Universities  UK  (2006)  report  that  the  HE  sector  is  worth 
£45billion  to  the  UK economy and Higher  Education  export  earnings  are  approximately 
£3.6billion.  There is clearly therefore a business case that can be made for ensuring that 
academic  pay is  sufficiently  high  to  maintain  an internationally  competitive  high  quality 
academe. This argument has been made in a number of influential government reports and 
White  Papers (e.g.  Bett  Review,  1999; DfES, 2003a, House of Commons Education and 
Skills Committee, 2003). Academic pay also matters because staff pay is the major cost of 
HE provision. So any increase in academic pay has substantial cost implications for HE as a 
whole, and of course for students and H M Treasury. As we widen access to higher education 
and there is further growth in the demand for HE academics, the cost implications of any 
changes in relative academic pay may be substantial.
2 Times Higher Education Supplement, ‘Academic pay rises lag behind teachers', 15th October, 2004; The 
Guardian, ‘MPs back academics as strike looms’, March 6th, 2006.
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One particular  potential  consequence  of  relatively low academic  pay is  the  much 
talked about ‘brain drain’. The Department for Education and Skills presented evidence that 
the relatively low pay for academics in the UK has negatively impacted on the ability of 
HEIs to recruit, retain and reward the best researchers (DfES, 2003a, Chapter 4). Indeed the 
DfES (2003a) highlighted a worrying trend increase in the number of unfilled vacancies in 
the  HE sector,  particularly  in  certain  subject  areas  such  as  IT/computing,  business  and 
medicine. However,  the UCEA has suggested that there is not a general recruitment  and 
retention crisis,  so pay rates must, it has argued, be competitive. Evidence from the Higher 
Education Policy Institute indicates that the UK is, in fact, a net importer of academics.3 For 
every 10 academics exported,  UK academic institutions appear to have received 14 from 
overseas over the period 1995/6-2002/3. This does not of course disprove the ‘brain drain’ 
argument. Academics from overseas may be replacing UK academics precisely because of a 
brain drain of talent to the US. Other countries, such as the US, are significant importers of 
foreign recruits into HE. If one imagines a global market for high quality academics, then 
one might expect that the most able go to jobs in countries where relative academic pay is 
highest (e.g. the US), and lower quality recruits go to countries where relative academic pay 
is lower. 
Of course the so-called ‘brain drain’ problem could apply to any profession that is 
relatively  better  rewarded  in  other  countries.  However,  the  issue  may  be  particularly 
important for HE. Firstly,  academic  skills are arguably more transferable across countries. 
Many professions, such as engineers, doctors and lawyers, have restrictions on their right to 
practice in some countries. Secondly, much of the literature makes the case for education and 
skills  as  a  key  driver  of  economic  productivity,  growth,  innovation  and  future 
competitiveness. Since HE is an important producer of education and skills, a brain drain in 
this sector may be of even greater concern to policy-makers. 
To rise above the rhetoric, there is a pressing need for robust empirical evidence on a 
range of issues around both academic salaries and the overall level of resourcing of the HE 
sector. In this paper, we compare the salaries of Higher Education teaching professionals in 
the United Kingdom with those of other comparable professionals, to investigate the extent to 
which academics earn more or less than other similarly qualified individuals in the UK. We 
3 THES, ‘UK Brain Drain Myth Exposed’, 7th October, 2005.
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add to the existing literature in a number of ways.  Firstly,  we offer evidence on relative 
salaries in HE academia over a long time period, namely the last decade or so. Secondly, we 
go  beyond  comparing  HE  academic  salaries  with  average  wages.  Instead  we  compare 
academic  salaries  to  a  range  of  different  comparator  groups,  focusing  on  specific 
occupational  groupings  that  one  might  view  as  similar,  in  terms  of  unobserved 
characteristics, to academics. Thirdly, we consider the extent to which the gap between the 
earnings of HE academics and that of other occupations is attributable to differences in the 
characteristics  of academics,  for example  the fact that  they are more  highly educated on 
average,  or to  differences  in  the  price paid for  a  given set  of characteristics.  This  paper 
therefore also provides evidence, for a select range of occupations, on the extent to which 
some groups of workers are able to secure a higher price for their endowments.
2. Background Literature
Whilst the literature on school teachers’ pay is considerable, both in the UK and in the US 
(e.g. Allegretto et al., 2004; Chevalier et al., 2007, Stoddard, 2005; and Taylor, 2005 to cite 
but a few), the literature on academic pay in higher education is relatively limited. There is in 
fact a large literature on intra-industry earnings differentials, i.e. differences in pay between 
different types of HE academic, and the link between academic pay and productivity.  For 
example, there is a literature on academic wage differences by gender, ethnicity,  age and 
subject area (Barbezat, 1987; Bayer and Astin, 1968; Blackaby and Frank, 2000; Blackaby et  
al., 2005; Ginther and Hayes 1999; Moore et al. 1998; Ward, 2001). There are also a few 
cross-country papers that compare academic pay across different countries (e.g. Metcalf  et  
al.,  2005;  Ong and  Mitchell,  2000  and  Stevens,  2004).  With  the  notable  exceptions  of 
Stevens and Metcalf et al., we were unable to find any published UK research that examined 
differences between HE academic pay and other similar professions.
Stevens  (2004)  examines  the  recruitment  and  retention  problem  in  UK  Higher 
Education Institutions (HEIs). He compares the salaries of academics in the UK relative to 
their US counterparts in order to help explain why the US is the most favoured destination of 
migrating academics.  In addition,  he compares UK academic salaries with other graduate 
professionals in the UK, to demonstrate why an academic career is a less attractive option to 
‘potential’ academics. Stevens uses the quarterly data from the Labour Force Survey (LFS) 
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from Spring to Winter 2001 for the UK and the Current Population Survey 2001 for the US. 
Stevens found that academic salaries start at a lower level for graduates in the UK, relative to 
non-academic  UK salaries,  and that  the predicted lifetime earnings of UK academics  are 
lower than their non-academic counterparts. He concludes that both UK and US academics 
are paid less than their non-academic counterparts and that relative UK academic pay rates 
are  below  those  of  their  US  counterparts  at  all  ages,  which  contributes  to  the  current 
recruitment and retention problems being experienced by the sector.
Metcalf  et  al. (2005)  studied  the  reasons  for  individuals  entering  and  leaving 
academic  employment  in  HE institutions  (HEIs)  in  England using  data  from the  Higher 
Education Statistics Agency (2001/02), as well as data collected specifically for their study. 
By matching samples on a range of characteristics, they compared the pay of UK academics 
with  similarly  qualified  professionals  in  the  UK and with  other  academics  in  the  USA, 
Canada, Sweden, France, Australia and Japan. In each country they used the relevant national 
labour force survey data. The data are quite problematic, for example the destination details 
of  60%  of  those  leaving  the  profession  were  not  available.  However,  it  is  the  most 
comprehensive study of its type in the UK. Metcalf et al. found that, in comparison to other 
highly qualified workers, academics fared relatively worse. They argued that this could deter 
new entrants into the profession. Relatively lower pay would however, have a lesser impact 
on incumbents who are less likely to exit the profession as their skills become more highly 
specialised and, perhaps, less transferable over time. Metcalf et al. concluded that academic 
pay  in  England  is  relatively  higher  in  real  terms  when  compared  to  academic  pay  in 
Australia,  New  Zealand,  Japan  and  Sweden,  though  broadly  similar  to  pay  levels  in 
Denmark, France and Canada. US academics, they suggest, receive relatively more and this 
could be a significant factor in attracting UK academics to US HEIs. Although the authors 
did not identify acute recruitment and retention problems in UK universities, they did report 
that some vacancies went unfilled and that there was a perceived deterioration in the quality 
of candidates for vacant positions. The study found that 40% of recruits into the sector were 
non-UK nationals.
3. Data, Methodological Issues and Descriptive Statistics
For this study, we use pooled UK Labour Force Survey data for the years 1993 to 
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2005. These data are held at individual level and include information on each individual’s 
annual earnings, hours of work, age, qualification level,  ethnicity,  gender, occupation and 
region  of  residence.4 We  construct  hourly  earnings  for  all  individuals  in  the  sample 
(including part-time workers) and we exclude from our sample individuals who are younger 
than 20 and older than 65. The dependent variable used in regressions is the log of net wages 
per hour, where net wages per hour are the sum of primary (netwk) and secondary (netwk2) 
occupations  net  wages  divided  by  actual  hours  worked  (acthr and  acthr2).  The  sample 
includes 260,484 individuals with wage information, of which just over 50,000 are university 
graduates.
We estimate earnings equations to compare HE academic pay to the pay of other 
selected groups, whilst controlling for observable characteristics that determine earnings and 
which may vary across the occupational groupings. Specifically we are able to control for 
ethnicity,  age,  gender,  residential  location,  qualification  level  and  degree  subject.  By 
including these personal  characteristics  in  the model,  we are able  to  assess the extent  to 
which differences in hourly earnings between academics and other professional groupings 
are  due  largely  to  the  personal  characteristics  of  academics  rather  than  their  choice  of 
occupation.  Comparator  groups  of  interest  include  secondary  school  teachers,  medical 
professionals, accountants, engineers, lawyers and other professionals, split into public and 
private  sector  wherever  possible.  The  vector  of  occupation  dummy  variables  includes 
different occupations according to the particular specification in use but always includes a 
dummy variable equal to the value of one if the person is an HE academic. The coefficient on 
the HE academic variable therefore measure the wage premium earned by HE academics 
compared to the base comparator group, once one takes account of both schooling levels and 
other personal characteristics.
There are a number of potentially important methodological problems. Firstly, it may 
be that academics are more able (or less able) on average than other workers. This may mean 
that they would earn more (or less) in the labour market; regardless of what profession they 
chose to work in.  We do not have a measure of IQ or ability in our data.  However,  we 
attempt to address this issue at least in part by comparing HE academics with other workers 
that a priori one might argue would have similar ability. Thus we emphasize the results that 
4 The analysis excludes individuals who are self-employed for whom data on net earnings were only collected in 
the Labour Force Survey from 1993 onwards.
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compare HE academics with physicians and lawyers, who have similar status and training 
requirements, as compared to the results based on a much more diverse group of graduates. 
Another more general issue is that workers tend to choose occupations that they will do well 
in and we cannot take this occupational choice into account in our model. A further potential 
methodological  concern  is  that  we  need  to  take  account  of  selectivity  generated  by 
individual’s  labor  market  participation  decisions.  To  address  these  selection  issues  we 
employ a Heckman selection model (Heckman , 1976).
Within the sample we have 1,437 HE academics. We define HE academics as those 
individuals who state that they are teaching professionals working in the HE sector, which 
unambiguously includes only those at the professional level in HE. One would also like to 
identify researchers in Higher Education, some of whom may not have been categorized as 
academics  (this  might  particularly be the case for part-time researchers  early on in  their 
careers). However, investigation of the LFS data suggested that selecting individuals who 
classified themselves as researchers and then identifying those working in the HE sector was 
not satisfactory and less than 100 individuals in our sample classified themselves in this way.  
We therefore focus exclusively on HE teaching professionals, a group that henceforth we 
describe as HE academics.
Table 1 compares the mean log hourly earnings of various occupational groups. As 
can  be  seen,  HE  teaching  professionals  with  real  hourly  wages  of  £8.92,  rank  below 
accountants (£9.63), consultants (£10.75), lawyers (£10.23), physicians (£10.56), pharmacists 
(£9.19)  and  dentists  (£12.88)  but  above  other  academics  (i.e.  FE  employees:  £8.38), 
secondary school teachers (£7.91), engineers (£8.25) and graduates as a group (£8.68). In 
terms of hourly pay, then, HE teaching professionals do poorly compared with many other 
occupational groupings but still do better than the average graduate in terms of net hourly 
wages. 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE>
The average hours worked for 11 occupational groups is given in Table 2. Whilst the 
focus of the paper is on the relative pay of HE academics, ideally we would want to consider  
other pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards to being an academic. Unfortunately we have no 
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data on some potentially important pecuniary benefits, such as pensions. However, we do 
have information on the hours worked by HE academics,  which may be a potential  non-
pecuniary  benefit  if  academics  work  fewer  hours  than  other  similar  workers.  Of  course 
simply measuring hours worked is not enough to fully capture differences in work effort and 
intensity across different occupations.5 Whilst we do not have data on the intensity of work 
by HE academics (nor are there any UK information sources on this to our knowledge), we 
nonetheless argue that average hours worked per week is an important dimension on which 
we can judge the attractiveness (or otherwise) of being an HE academic.
The average hours worked by all graduates in their primary job (excluding unpaid 
overtime) is 34.2 hours. HE teaching professionals work only slightly more hours than the 
average and less than  physicians,  engineers  and consultants.  Even when second jobs  are 
included,  the  picture  changes  little  in  terms  of  occupational  rankings  by  hours  worked. 
However, once overtime (paid and unpaid) is included, HE teaching professionals record the 
second highest number of hours worked on average, behind physicians. In other words, HE 
professionals appear to be working large numbers of over time hours, which by and large will 
be unpaid, as compared to other occupational groups. 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE>
Table 3 tracks changes in average hours worked over time. Although HE teaching 
professionals  have  generally  worked  longer  hours  than  secondary  school  teachers,  the 
position began to reverse by 2004. From a peak of 49 hours in 2000/2001 and 2002/03, HE 
academics have experienced a slight fall in the number of hours worked. Physicians have 
seen a 15.1% fall  in their  average hours over time though they still  worked the greatest 
number of hours in total compared to the other groups in 2004. The final two columns of the 
table show the differences in average hours worked between HE academics and all graduates 
as well as those graduates employed specifically in the public sector. Average hours worked 
by graduates has remained stable over time but the gap between HE teaching professionals 
and average graduate hours widened throughout the nineties, as HE academics worked longer 
5 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for raising this point. Although we were unable to find data on work 
intensity within academia, the various metrics that are used (particularly in the RAE) to measure academic 
output suggest some potential for research into this issue.
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hours. However, the gap reduced somewhat in 2004. Public sector graduates, on the other 
hand, have tended to work longer hours and therefore the gap between them and HE teaching 
professionals is not as great. Once again the gap narrowed in 2004.  
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE>
It therefore appears that, in terms of hourly wages, HE academics do relatively poorly 
compared to many other professional groupings, although better than the average graduate. 
Of course we do not know whether this is because HE academics have other characteristics, 
such as fewer years of work experience, that mean that they earn lower wages than many 
other types of professional. This is explored in the regression analysis  below. It is worth 
noting however,  that  HE academics’  total  hours worked per week is  relatively high.  We 
allow for this in the regressions below by using log hourly wages. 
4. Regression results
The main regression estimates are presented in Table 4. The results come from a standard 
Mincer model of earnings (Mincer, 1974).6 The regression includes a range of controls, such 
as gender, age, ethnicity,  education, region of residence and a set of time (year) dummies 
included to capture  factors  that  are  idiosyncratic  to  any given year.  The first  column of 
results  compares  the  hourly  wages  of  HE  academics  and  a  number  of  other  specific 
occupations, to the hourly wages of all wage earners omitting educational attainment. Some 
of the coefficients in the first column of results are unsurprising. For example, the regression 
suggests that older workers earn more than younger workers, women earn less than men, and 
some ethnic minority groups earn less than whites.  We introduce educational  and degree 
subject  variables  in  the  second  specification.  The  coefficients  on  degree  subjects  are 
interesting in that the wage premium from certain degree subjects is considerably above the 
average for all other graduates. In particular science, and social science attract a higher wage 
premium. As one might also expect,  more educated individuals by and large have higher 
6 Throughout the analysis we use hourly wages that incorporate primary and secondary earnings. We have 
examined the data excluding part time employees under alternative definitions of full-time employment 
(working more then twenty-five and thirty-five hours per week) and the findings of the paper do not change 
qualitatively.  We also examine primary wage earners in isolation. Again there was no qualitative change to the 
key findings.
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earnings. The wage premium for a Doctorate is approximately 44% and the premium for a 
Masters degree around 42%, for example, as compared to an unqualified worker.7
<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE>
The coefficients of greatest interest, however, are on the specific occupations listed. 
These suggest that HE academics earn about 25% more than all other workers. This premium 
is reduced to just 2.5% when education attainment is controlled for in the equation (column 
2).  However,  we  identified  a  major  methodological  issue  in  this  research,  namely  the 
potential for ability bias. It is possible that HE academics are of higher (lower) ability than 
other groups of workers and that since we do not have any measure of this ability in our 
model,  we  have  biased  estimates  of  the  wage  premium  associated  with  being  an  HE 
academic.  As has already been said, we are unable to include measures of ability in our 
model due to data limitations. However, we are able to make comparisons with groups that 
are  arguably  more  similar  to  HE  academics,  in  terms  of  their  expected  unobserved 
characteristics.  We thus  compare  the  wage  premium  for  HE academics  to  the  premium 
earned by physicians, dentists, secondary school teachers, FE teachers and a number of other 
occupations that we argue are more comparable than the heterogenous group of all graduates. 
Whilst  this  does  not  overcome  the  problem  of  endogenous  occupational  choice,  such 
comparisons  are  more  meaningful  than  comparing  academics  to  all  other  occupational 
groupings. 
Focusing now on these more comparable groups, the first column of Table 4 suggests 
that HE academics earn a more favorable wage premium as compared to secondary school 
teachers and FE academics. However, accountants, those in the legal profession, consultants, 
physicians,  pharmacists  and  dental  practitioners  all  attract  considerably  higher  wage 
premiums than do HE academics. Once one controls for education in the model however, HE 
academics  earn  a  similar  wage  to  FE  academics  and  secondary  school  teachers,  and  a 
considerably lower premium than other professional groups. Thus for example, consultants 
earn 28% more than the average worker, whilst academics earn just under 3% more than the 
7 We experimented with subject interaction terms in order to try to assess whether there were systematic 
differences between academics in different subject area. For example, whether academics in the social sciences 
were better remunerated then those in the arts and humanities. The results were not robustly determined. This 
reflects the sample size difficulties arising from the relatively small number of academics contained in the 
sample.
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average worker.
Another  consideration  when  choosing  a  comparator  group  is  the  fact  that  HE 
academics  are  almost  universally  highly  educated,  as  are  individuals  in  the  comparator 
occupations of interest, such as doctors and lawyers. That education is a crucial factor across 
all the professions examined is highlighted by the substantial decline in wage premiums for 
specific  occupations  when  educational  attainment  and  degree  subject  are  introduced  in 
column  2.  Thus  for  columns  3  and  4  we  restrict  the  sample  to  graduates  only,  i.e.  all  
individuals who have a first degree or above. Almost all HE academics are employed in the 
public sector, so we start by analyzing a sample of all public sector graduates as a natural 
comparator  group. The third column of results  in Table 4 shows the coefficients  from a 
model where the base case is all public sector graduates. Many of the coefficients change, 
reflecting differences in pay practices in the public sector. For example, the wage premiums 
associated  with  age  are  higher  in  the  public  sector  graduate  regression,  reflecting  the 
importance of seniority in determining pay in the public sector. However, we focus most of 
our  commentary  on  the  occupational  coefficients,  which  are  our  prime  interest.  HE 
academics earn around the average rate for a public sector graduate employee. Again this 
compares favorably to FE academics and similarly to secondary school teachers. However, 
HE academics are rewarded poorly when compared to all the other comparator groups. The 
ranking of the professions is actually quite similar across the different specifications. Thus 
HE academics still compare relatively poorly to those in the legal profession, accountants, 
physicians,  pharmacists  and dental  practitioners.  HE academics  do earn significantly less 
than engineers too, although the gap is not so large. 
In column 4, HE academics  are compared to all  graduates regardless of sector of 
work.  Again,  we are most  interested  in  the coefficients  on the  occupation variables.  HE 
academics earn around 3% less than all graduates. The ranking of the different professions 
does  not  change  substantially  as  compared  to  the  previous  regressions.  The  only  other 
professional groupings that earn less then the average graduate are secondary school teachers 
and FE academics, the latter being particularly poorly paid relative to the average graduate. 
Secondary school teachers and HE academics are similarly rewarded after controlling for 
education and other characteristics. All other professions listed earn significantly more than 
HE academics, with dental practitioners being most highly rewarded. 
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The results  in Table  4 come from a Mincer  earnings  equation that  does not  take 
account of employment participation decisions. We therefore re-estimated the models using a 
Heckman’s selection model. The model is identified by a number of variables that predict 
employment but should have not direct impact on wages, namely individuals’ marriage status 
interacted with gender and whether the individual has children under the age of five years old 
living in the household. The resulting coefficients from this selection model are extremely 
similar to those obtained via straightforward OLS estimation thus allowing us to feel secure 
that labour market participation decisions are not unduly impacting on the analysis.8
One can conclude from Table 4 therefore that whilst HE academics do relatively well 
compared to the average worker, and somewhat better than the average worker with a similar 
level of education (see column 2), they do earn considerably less per hour than most other 
comparator professions. Since these comparator professions have been selected for their long 
training period, one could argue that they should include individuals that are more similar to 
HE academics.  If  low relative pay affects  the quality of those entering the HE academic 
profession, it may be of concern that we observe that HE academics earn consistently less per 
hour  than  accountants,  those  in  the  legal  profession,  consultants,  engineers,  physicians, 
pharmacists  and dental  practitioners,  even once one controls for the characteristics  of the 
individuals concerned.
Thus  far  we  have  focused  on  the  simple  shifts  in  the  intercept  associated  with 
particular occupations. There may also be interaction effects between the occupation dummy 
variables  and other  controls  in  the  model.  Some of  these  interaction  effects,  such as  by 
gender, age and public/private sector are indeed explored in the paper. Ideally we would have 
liked to examine further interactions, such as between degree subject and occupation. For 
instance, we may hypothesise that the relative wage gap between HE academics and some 
other occupations may vary by degree subject. However, small cell sizes precluded us from 
undertaking this kind of analysis,  although of course by focusing on specific occupations 
such as medics and dentists, we take account of subject specialization to some extent.
We were however, able to focus on interactions by gender. It is evident from Table 4 
that female workers earn considerably less (up to 15% less) than male professionals, even 
when one takes account of individuals’ characteristics, such as age and education. One might 
8 These findings are available on request, but will also be posted electronically at the authors web addresses, for 
the interested reader.
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also expect that the relative position of women varies by type of occupation and certainly 
there is evidence that this is so for academia (McNabb and Wass, 1997 and Ward, 2001, to 
cite but a few). We therefore estimate our preferred model (column 4 of Table 4) separately 
for men and women and the results are shown in Table 5. The base case for this regression is 
therefore all graduate workers. Many of the coefficients on the explanatory variables vary by 
gender. For example, the wage premium from age (seniority) is higher for male graduates 
than for women. However, again we focus our commentary on the occupation coefficients. 
The coefficients on the occupational variables suggest that male HE academics earn around 
6% less  than  the  average  male  graduate,  even  after  controlling  for  education  and  other 
characteristics. This compares favorably to FE academics and to a lesser extent secondary 
school  teachers.  However,  male  accountants,  consultants,  engineers,  pharmacists,  dental 
practitioners, physicians, and those in the legal profession all earn a higher wage premium 
than male HE academics. Female HE academics earn a similar wage to the average female 
graduate,  as  do  female  FE  academics  and  secondary  school  teachers.  The  occupational 
ranking for females is, however, similar to the ranking for men. Female HE academic wages 
compare poorly against all the other occupations listed.
<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE>
Another  issue  that  needs  to  be  considered  is  the  relative  position  of  academics 
throughout their careers. Much of the public debate on academic salaries has suggested that 
academia is particularly unattractive later on in a person’s career (The Economist, ‘Its Own 
Reward’, May 16th 2002). Yet Stevens (2004) found that UK academics' salaries declined in 
later  life  at  a  slower  rate  than  for  other  graduates.   We  address  this  issue  directly  by 
estimating our preferred model separately for different age groups; specifically we estimate 
three models for age ranges 30-39, 40-49 and 50 plus. Whilst somewhat arbitrary, these age 
groupings reflect the fact that most academics have finished their training by the age of 30, 
and also the decade groupings provide sufficient sample sizes to determine differences across 
the lifecourse.9 These are shown in Table 6. Again some of the explanatory variables have 
9 An alternative approach suggested by a referee would be to analyse age-occupational interactions to trace out 
the evolution over time. Unfortunately, severe multicollinearity between the direct effects and interaction terms 
generated dramatic and unpredictable shifts in the coefficients. We should note that modelling age as a 
continuous variable, rather then by cohorts, had no significant impact on the findings of the paper.
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very different effects on hourly earnings at different ages. So, for example, young women 
(age  30-39)  earn  around  6% less  than  males.  By contrast,  older  women  (50  plus)  earn 
approximately  17%  less  than  their  male  counterparts,  even  after  controlling  for  other 
characteristics such as ethnicity and education level.
Our  primary  interest  in  Table  6  is  however,  with  the  occupation  variables.  HE 
academics earn around 8% less than other graduates up to the age of 40. However, above the 
age of 40, the relative wage of HE academics rises to around the mean for all other graduates 
(the coefficient on the HE academics coefficient is insignificant in columns 2 and 3). This 
may suggest, contrary to the public perception of the problem, that older academics actually 
do  relatively  better  than  younger  academics,  at  least  compared  to  all  other  graduates. 
However,  the coefficients are negative if not significant  so we would not want to overly 
stress this result and in any case, in every age group, HE academics earn considerably less 
than  most  of  the  other  occupational  groupings  listed,  particularly  physicians,  dental 
practitioners, those in the legal profession and consultants. By contrast, FE academics and 
secondary school teachers do relatively poorly even compared to HE academics, particularly 
after the age of 40. There are substantial differences in the magnitude of the wage premium 
associated  with  each  occupation  across  different  ages.  At  the  age  of  30-39,  the  wage 
premium for those in the legal profession is around 18%, which is a 26% premium on HE 
academics. However, by age 40-49, the premium from being in a legal occupation has risen 
to  30%,  compared  to  HE  academics  (and  other  graduates).   Therefore  the  potential 
attractiveness of working in HE will vary according to both the specific occupation that one 
is making comparisons with, as well as the age range under consideration. Relative to many 
similar professions HE academics do not experience a major relative decline in their wages 
later in their careers, in contrast to the results from Stevens (2004).
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE>
The regressions described above give a clear indication of the ranking of different 
occupations and the wage premium associated with being an HE academic, both by gender 
and age. However, we are also interested in the extent to which we can explain gaps in pay 
between different occupations. To what extent is the relatively low pay experienced by a 
particular group down to the characteristics of that group or the fact that the same set of 
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characteristics is rewarded less highly in that occupation. To answer this question we turn to 
the  Oaxaca-Blinder  decompositions  (Blinder,  1973;  Oaxaca,  1973).  From  the  simplified 
standard regression below, where the wages of two groups j  (HE academics  and another 
group) are determined by various explanatory variables X, with the usual error term. 
The conditional mean difference in the wages between the two groups  R can be shown to 
consist  of  an  explained  difference  (the  first  term  in  the  model  below),  attributable  to 
differences in the characteristics of the two groups, and an unexplained difference (the term 
in  square  brackets),  attributable  to  different  rewards  to  the  two  groups  for  the  same 
characteristics. In this way we can measure the extent to which the relative pay position of 
HE  academics  is  attributable  to  their  different  characteristics,  as  compared  to  other 
occupational groups, or due to the fact that they are rewarded differently for the attributes 
they  possess.  However,  it  is  clearly  the  case  that  differences  in  pay that  are  apparently 
unexplained by individuals’ characteristics may reflect genuine differences in characteristics 
that are unmeasured in our data. This needs to be born in mind in the interpretation of results.
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Given our findings above (Table 5) that suggest that HE academic relative pay varies 
by gender, we also estimate the decompositions by gender. Table 7 shows results for the full  
sample, Table 8 for women only. The first decomposition in Table 7 compares all graduates 
with HE academics specifically. As Table 4 shows, graduates earn marginally more than HE 
academics  after  controlling  for  individual  characteristics.  When  the  difference  in  pay 
between these two groups is decomposed, the results indicate that HE academics have better 
endowments or characteristics than the average graduate. Thus HE academics should earn 
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more than the average graduate, on the basis of their endowments (214.9% of the gap in pay 
between HE academics and all other graduates is attributable to differences in endowments 
between the two groups). In other words, the gap between HE academics and other graduates 
is largely down to an unexplained component (labeled discrimination in table 7). Thus HE 
academics  would earn more as a result  of their  different  (better)  characteristics  (they are 
older and more educated) but this is offset due to unexplained factors that reduce their wages. 
It is of course possible that this latter difference may be accounted for by unobserved ability 
and other characteristic differences between the groups that exist but are unmeasured in our 
data.
<INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE>
Table 7 also shows Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for other specific occupations, 
particularly  secondary  school  teachers  and  doctors.  In  the  case  of  comparisons  between 
graduates and secondary school teachers, nearly 80% of the higher pay earned by graduates, 
as compared to secondary school teachers, is attributable to differences in the characteristics 
of  the  two  groups.  Only  20%  of  the  pay  gap  is  unexplained.  Comparing  graduates  to 
physicians, around 17% of the pay gap between physicians and other graduates is down to 
differences  in  characteristics  (physicians  are  more  educated,  for  example).  83%  of  the 
difference is unexplained or down to the fact that physicians receive a higher price for the 
same set of characteristics as other graduates. Again it is possible that the unexplained gap is 
actually  due to  differences  in  unobserved abilities  that  mean that  physicians  would have 
earned higher wages anyway. 
The final column in Table 7 compares the pay of doctors and HE academics directly. 
There  is  a  considerable  wage  gap,  with  physicians  much  more  highly  paid  than  HE 
academics.  43.5% of  this  gap is  attributable  to  differences  in  the characteristics  between 
physicians and academics. Thus 56.5% of the pay gap between doctors and HE academics is 
unexplained or down to the fact that doctors earn a considerably higher premium for their 
endowments. This means physicians earn more than HE academics not only because they 
have superior endowments but also because they earn a higher price for the endowments that 
they do have.  It  is  of  course still  possible  however,  that  some of  the  unexplained wage 
differential  is  actually  attributable  to  unobservable  differences  between  doctors  and  HE 
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academics.
Table 8 then shows the results for women specifically.  The first  column indicates 
that,  as  for  males,  female  academics  have  more  endowments  than  the  average  female 
graduate and that a large proportion of the wage gap (124%) is attributable to their better 
endowments. However, this is partially offset by the unexplained component i.e. the fact that 
female academics earn a lower return to those endowments.  Moving to the final column, 
again female doctors earn more than female academics. Only a very small proportion of this 
pay gap is attributable to endowments (5.8%) and 94% of the difference is attributable to the 
fact that female doctors earn a higher return to their endowments than do female academics.
Tables 7 and 8 therefore suggests that a substantial proportion (57-94%) of the wage 
gap between doctors and HE academics is unexplained and also attributable to the fact that 
doctors appear to earn more for a given set of characteristics. This evidence is consistent with 
our main finding, namely that HE academics do relatively badly compared to the average 
graduate and they compare unfavourably to other, arguably more comparable, public sector 
workers who have a superior position vis-à-vis their ability to secure a higher price for their 
characteristics.
5. Conclusions
This  paper  provides  a  descriptive  analysis  of  the  relative  earnings  of  HE  teaching 
professionals and concludes that HE teaching professionals earn higher than average hourly 
earnings, as compared to all other workers, although they also work longer hours than most. 
However, once one compares HE teaching professionals with graduates or other more similar 
occupations  that  require  a  substantial  amount  of  postgraduate  training,  the  wages  of  HE 
academics  do  not  compare  favourably.  In  particular,  the  earnings  of  HE  teaching 
professionals compare very poorly to accountants, those in the legal professions, consultants, 
engineers,  physicians,  pharmacists  and  dental  practitioners  (across  both  the  public  and 
private sectors).  In our study, there were only two groups of workers that did worse than HE 
academics in terms of pay,  namely FE teachers and, to a lesser extent,  secondary school 
teachers. 
We investigated the sources of the overall gap in pay between different groups of 
workers. An interesting story emerges. Some predominantly public sector groups, such as 
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physicians, have been particularly effective in securing higher pay overall and a higher price 
for  their  endowments.  Thus,  much  of  the gap between doctors  and other  graduates  (and 
indeed between doctors and HE academics) is down to the fact that physicians earn a higher 
price  to  their  observed characteristics.  This  may be because  physicians  have unobserved 
characteristics that tend to mean that their productivity and pay is higher, and that we have 
not been able to account for this in the model. However, it could also indicate that physicians  
have greater political and economic power and have therefore been able to negotiate a higher 
price for their endowments. Clearly in the case of doctors this may rightly reflect the higher 
value that society places on their skills. However, we found HE academics compared poorly 
not just to doctors but to a range of other professions, including lawyers, consultants and 
engineers. This may be cause for concern if the UK aspires to maintain the quality of its 
world class HE sector by attracting the best individuals into the profession.
We also  found that  the  economic  position  of  HE academics  varied  over  the  life 
course, in terms of their relative wages. We found no evidence to support the conventional 
wisdom of a widening gap in pay between academics and other graduates as workers age. 
However, it is also apparent that the pay-gap between HE academics and some other specific 
groups, such as doctors, does widen over the life course. Again, one’s view of the evidence 
depends substantially on the comparator group under consideration. It is also worth noting 
that  we were not  able  to  take  account  of  pension earnings  associated  with being an HE 
academic, which may or may not reduce the lifetime earnings gap between HE academics 
and other professionals.
This paper provides evidence on the long run position of HE academics. Specifically, 
we investigated relative pay for HE academics over the previous decade. Whilst trends over 
time are accounted for in the regressions, we do not consider the changing nature of the gap 
over time. This is because small  sample sizes preclude estimating an HE academic wage 
premium on an annual basis. Thus it is possible that within the decade considered in this 
paper, the relative position of HE academics improved (or deteriorated).  In any case, this 
paper cannot address the question of whether the relative earnings position of HE academics 
has  worsened  over  the  last  thirty  or  forty  years  or  so,  as  has  been  argued  by  many 
commentators. This would obviously be central to any consideration of whether the quality 
of HE academics is likely to have declined over a longer time frame, due to falling relative 
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wages.
Our findings are of great policy importance.  A high quality higher education sector 
requires high quality academics. Higher relative pay will attract better quality individuals 
into academe. Furthermore, the issue of relative pay (and in general the attractiveness of an 
academic  occupation)  will  tend  to  affect  postgraduate  study  as  well  as  recruitment. 
Enrollments  onto  PhD  programmes  are  likely  to  be  affected  if  the  short-term  costs  of 
postgraduate study are high and the long-term benefits, in terms of relative pay, are low. Pay 
is  therefore  a  quality  issue and the relatively disadvantageous  position  of  HE academics 
should  be of  some concern  to  policy-makers.  Given the  good international  reputation  of 
many of the UK’s universities (and the size of the sector in terms of contribution to the UK 
economy), we would argue that at the very least, the relative pay of HE academics needs to 
be monitored closely over the next few years. In particular, as the HE sector continues to 
expand, it is essential to recognize the risk that achieving the government’s target of 50% of 
young people participating in HE may further reduce relative academic pay (and increase 
hours of work) with a potentially negative impact on quality.  Of course it is important to 
recognize that any change to academic pay also has significant implications for the costs of 
higher education (which in turn has implications for access). Whilst relatively low academic 
pay  may  cause  universities  to  have  difficulty  in  attracting  high  quality  candidates  into 
academe  (at  least  in  certain  subjects),  it  also  helps  keep  the  cost  base  down.  Any 
reconsideration  of  academic  pay  would  have  implications  for  costs,  tuition  fees  and 
ultimately widening access. Again this is an important reason to continue to monitor relative 
HE pay, as well as differences in pay and resourcing levels within higher education.
Some caveats to the research are necessary. Firstly, the paper focuses on a specific 
group of HE workers, namely teaching professionals. Other workers in the HE sector, such as 
librarians, are not considered. Secondly, it was not possible to estimate the wage premium for 
HE teaching  professionals  by  degree  subject  and  by  gender.  Other  descriptive  evidence 
suggests that the relative position of academics in certain subjects, such as science and IT, 
may be much worse than described here. Unfortunately, given data limitations, there is no 
solution  to  this  latter  problem.  There  are  also  two  additional  questions  that  need  to  be 
addressed in  future  research.  There  may be substantial  non-pecuniary benefits  associated 
with being an HE academic and, in particular,  greater flexibility in working patterns and 
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higher job satisfaction.  This study does not take account of these potential  benefits.  One 
cannot assume however that being an HE academic is necessarily a ‘good’ job, in terms of 
the non-pecuniary benefits: this is an empirical question. We note in this study, for example, 
that HE academics work longer hours than many other professional groups (but not doctors), 
which may be considered a substantial disbenefit of the job. Further research is also needed 
to provide evidence on the relative pay of academics in the UK, as compared to the relative 
position  of  academics  in  other  countries.  Certainly  the  market  for  top  academics  is 
international.  To  understand  further  the  potential  for  a  UK  brain  drain,  as  successful 
academics flock to the US for example, we need more evidence on relative academic salaries 
across a range of countries. 
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Appendix: Technical Information
This appendix details the derivation of the LFS variables listed below, with variable names 
given in brackets.
The  dependent  variable,  net  wages  per  hour,  is  the  sum of  primary  (netwk)  and 
secondary  (netwk2)  occupations  net  wages  divided  by  actual  hours  worked  (acthr and 
acthr2).
Degree subject classifications (sngdeg) are consistently defined in to the aggregated 
groups to account for definitional changes that occurred in 2004. The variable is referenced 
against those without degree subjects. In the models where the sample contains academics or 
graduates it is referenced against those individuals who do not specify subject areas.
Educational qualification groups represent the 'highest qualification' obtained by each 
individual in the sample. These qualifications are, with the exception of vocational training, 
self-explanatory. High Vocational includes RSA High, Candg hghi, ONDBTEC, NVQ3; Mid 
Vocational  includes  Apprenticeship,  Candg med,  BTECdice,  NVQ2;  Vocational  includes 
Candg  (low),  RSA  (low),  NVQ1,  other  vocational  qualification.  "Higher  qualification" 
includes nursing, hediplom, otherhe and teaching unless degree. Graduates include all those 
with  undergraduate  or  postgraduate  tertiary  qualifications.  The  educational  variable 
classifications are consistently defined over time to account for changes in classifications that 
occurred over the sample period examined. The code used in generating these definitions is 
available from the authors on request.
Occupation groups are derived from the more general SOC1 variable (sc2kmmj) that 
sub-divides  occupations  into  nine  occupational  groups.  Specific  occupational  groups  are 
derived from the SOC2 variable (soc2km). Academics working in Higher Education [higher 
education teaching professionals (soc2km==2311)], and those in further education [further 
education teaching professionals (soc2km==2312)], are analysed separately with the relevant 
classifications codes being give in brackets. All of the individual groups are contained with 
the  ‘Professional  Occupations’  classification  (sc2kmmj for  the  value  2).  Engineers  are 
classified  as  civil  engineers  (soc2km==2121);  mechanical  engineers  (soc2km==2122); 
mechanical engineers (soc2km==2123); electronics engineers (soc2km==2124).
Regional  dummies  are  determined  by  geographical  groupings  of  administrative 
regions  where  residents  usually  reside  (ureg).  The  specific  regions  being:  Northern; 
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Yorkshire & Humberside; East Midlands; London; East Anglia (excluding Greater London); 
South West; West Midlands; North West; Wales; Scotland and N Ireland.
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Table 1:
Mean (log) wages 1994-2004 by occupation
mean( log) wages Std dev
Graduates 2.161 0.493
Academics (HE) 2.188 0.444
Academics (FE) 2.126 0.449
Secondary School Teachers 2.068 0.402
Dentists 2.556 0.463
Doctors 2.357 0.519
Pharmacists & Pharmacologists 2.218 0.424
Lawyers 2.326 0.510
Accountants 2.265 0.469
Consultants 2.375 0.546
Engineers 2.110 0.421
Source: LFS 1994-2004
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Table 2:
Average hours of work 1994-2004 by occupation
Primary job Secondary Primary and 
Secondary
Primary and Secondary
(excl. unpaid 
overtime)
(excl. unpaid 
overtime)
(excl unpaid overtime) (incl. overtime paid and 
unpaid)
Graduates 34.2 0.7 34.9 42.2
Academics (HE) 34.3 2.6 36.8 44.0
Academics (FE) 30.0 1.9 31.9 38.5
Secondary School Teachers 31.5 0.9 32.4 43.7
Dentists 31.0 0.6 31.6 35.6
Doctors 39.2 1.9 41.1 52.3
Pharmacists & Pharmacologists 34.0 1.7 35.8 38.0
Lawyers 34.2 0.3 34.5 41.7
Accountants 34.7 0.5 35.1 41.3
Consultants 34.2 0.3 34.5 40.8
Engineers 36.1 0.2 36.4 42.3
Source: LFS 1994-2004
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Table 3
Average hours of work, over time, by occupation, 1994-2004
Academic
s
Teachers Doctors Graduat
es
Public 
Sector
Graduates v Public Sector Graduates v
(HE) (Secondar
y)
Graduates HE 
Academics
HE Academics
1994-95 46.85 45.11 59.41 44.28 44.54 2.57 2.31
1996-97 46.63 46.08 58.94 44.66 44.84 1.97 1.79
1998-99 48.74 46.59 58.99 44.57 45.38 4.17 3.36
2000-01 49.13 47.73 56.81 44.62 45.46 4.51 3.67
2002-03 49.29 47.85 53.09 44.39 44.99 4.90 4.30
2004 47.38 47.12 51.62 44.32 44.76 3.06 2.62
Source: LFS 1994-2004; Note: Sample working in excess of 25 hours per week i.e. excluding part-time workers
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Table 4:
The wage premium associated with HE academic and other professions
(i) (ii)    (iii)                  
(iv)
                 
(v)
Dependent variable: ln(wages per hour)             All 
Occupations 
            All 
Occupations 
      Public Sector       Gradu
ates
      Gradu
ates
             (Excl. 
Education)
             (Incl. 
Education)
             (Graduates)      (Heckm
an)
Coeff tstat Coeff tstat Coeff tstat Coeff tstat Coeff tstat
Demographics
Age Age: 30-39 0.1843 (78.16) 0.2048 (90.31) 0.2112 (29.37) 0.2831 (56.94) 0.2882 (53.87)
Ref 20-29 years of age Age 40-49 0.1787 (71.14) 0.2312 (94.68) 0.2609 (35.89) 0.3221 (57.98) 0.3301 (52.46)
Age 50+ 0.1054 (39.59) 0.2015 (74.79) 0.2943 (34.43) 0.3217 (45.32) 0.3342 (41.91)
Sex Female -0.1106 (59.40) -0.1280 (71.39) -0.0718 (12.34) -0.0948 (21.99) -0.0950 (22.12)
Ethnicity Mixed Race -0.0963 (11.54) -0.0755 -(9.50) -0.0608 (2.73) -0.1383 (7.19) -0.1367 (7.33)
Ref: white Asian or Asian British -0.0983 (14.03) -0.0899 (13.92) -0.0904 (4.60) -0.0880 (6.91) -0.0845 (6.14)
Chinese 0.0083 (0.37) -0.0436 -(2.04) -0.1671 (4.25) -0.1029 (3.35) -0.1009 (2.95)
Black of Black British -0.0463 -(4.39) -0.0309 -(3.04) -0.0583 (1.98) -0.0788 (3.93) -0.0756 (4.05)
Other Ethnic Group -0.2342 (16.00) -0.2024 (14.39) -0.0761 (1.20) -0.1692 (4.14) -0.1689 (5.15)
Degree Medicine 0.1409 (20.45) 0.0404 (3.61) 0.0519 (4.05) 0.0522 (5.06)
Subject Biology-Agriculture-Physics 0.1030 (23.45) -0.0020 (1.15) 0.0114 (1.60) 0.0121 (1.66)
Ref: is non-graduate Maths-Engineering-Architecture 0.1483 (26.95) 0.0613 (3.61) 0.0791 (11.71) 0.0768 (11.41)
 except in graduate only Social Sciences 0.1431 (28.11) 0.0391 (3.83) 0.0332 (5.19) 0.0226 (2.07)
regressions where Humanities & Arts 0.0014 (1.56) -0.0348 (3.33) -0.0665 (8.68) -0.0528 (8.27)
unclassifed degrees Education 0.0209 (2.80) -0.0202 (1.91) -0.0439 (5.32) -0.0406 (4.92)
are the reference group Other Subjects 0.0323 (7.87)
Education Doctorate 0.4424 (44.39)
Ref is unqualified Masters 0.4210 (70.56) 0.0071 (0.52) -0.0094 (0.89) -0.0088 (0.82)
except in graduate only Other Postgraduate 0.3233 (38.09) -0.1073 (7.13) -0.1247 (10.16) -0.1233 (9.71)
regressions where Degree 0.3855 (94.03) -0.0654 (5.05) -0.0778 (8.01) -0.0773 (7.77)
doctorate is the High Qualification 0.3397 (70.34)
 reference group. Higher Vocational 0.2946 (74.24)
Mid Vocational 0.1041 (22.59)
Vocational 0.0527 (11.48)
A level(s) 0.3205 (84.14)
GCSE(s) 0.1580 (65.17)
Specific Occupations Academics (Higher Education) 0.2503 (21.42) 0.0253 (2.36) -0.0212 (1.61) -0.0430 (3.18) -0.0446 (3.24)
Ref other occupations Academics (Further Education) 0.1668 (14.11) 0.0247 (2.57) -0.0487 (3.16) -0.0632 (4.33) -0.0664 (4.55)
Teachers (Secondary) 0.1842 (32.11) 0.0207 (3.20) -0.0077 (1.01) -0.0274 (2.39) -0.0220 (2.87)
Dental Practitioners 0.6466 (12.37) 0.3972 (7.95) 0.4875 (9.28) 0.4715 (9.58) 0.4939 (7.43)
Doctors 0.4322 (36.46) 0.2450 (19.48) 0.2455 (14.27) 0.2161 (13.22) 0.2243 (13.55)
Pharmacists & Pharmacologists 0.3923 (17.77) 0.1456 (6.79) 0.1776 (4.38) 0.1641 (6.75) 0.1682 (5.74)
Solic & Lawyers, Judges & Coroners 0.4709 (33.85) 0.2379 (16.36) 0.3090 (8.27) 0.2042 (12.52) 0.2137 (12.34)
Accountants 0.3982 (46.84) 0.2306 (26.32) 0.2258 (7.64) 0.1739 (12.27) 0.1739 (11.95)
Consultants 0.4678 (32.59) 0.2832 (20.00) 0.1669 (4.35) 0.2407 (13.41) 0.2434 (14.61)
Engineers 0.2697 (49.28) 0.1290 (22.67) 0.0800 (3.80) 0.0168 (1.91) 0.0129 (1.25)
Public/Private Public 0.0734 (36.62) 0.0237 (13.75) -0.0365 (7.81) -0.0526 (7.53)
Constant 1.6781 (184.50) 1.4445 (153.18) 1.8689 (55.28) 1.9415 (76.17) 2.0065 (77.85)
Regional dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Quarter dummies YES YES YES YES YES
No. Obs 260,484 260,484 22,921 50,788 159,323
Censored obs 108,535
Uncensored obs 50,788
R2 0.165 0.261 0.181 0.208 0.2149
Ρ -0.048
Wald 12452.65
Source: LFS (1993 Q4 -2005 Q3). Notes: 1. Robust t-statistics in parentheses; 2. The dependent variable is the sum of primary and secondary occupations net 
wages per hour. Details of the LFS variables used to construct the dependent variable as well as qualification and occupational groups and the classification of 
regions are detailed in Appendix I; 3. The temporal stability of the characteristic coefficients was confirmed by the use of Chow testing on adjacent years; 5. The 
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Heckman model employs  individual’s marriage status, whether or not women are married, whether there are children under the age of five years in the selection 
model.
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Table 5:
The wage premium associated with being a HE academic and other professions by gender
(i)    (ii)
       Graduates       Graduates
         MALE        FEMALE
Dependent variable: ln(wages per hour) Coeff tstat Coeff tstat
Demographics
Age Age: 30-39 0.2488 (33.62) 0.2319 (30.58)
Ref 20-29 years of age Age 40-49 0.2971 (34.69) 0.2173 (24.41)
Age 50+ 0.2978 (27.92) 0.1968 (17.72)
Ethnicity Mixed Race -0.1911 (6.79) -0.0825 (3.12)
Ref: white Asian or Asian British -0.1079 (6.56) -0.0880 (4.44)
Chinese -0.1538 (3.78) -0.0356 (0.78)
Black of Black British -0.0802 (2.62) -0.0808 (3.11)
Other Ethnic Group -0.1557 (2.40) -0.2308 (5.02)
Degree Medicine 0.0592 (2.40) 0.0177 (1.32)
Subject Biology-Agriculture-Phisics 0.0460 (1.58) 0.0126 (1.27)
Maths-Engineering-Architecture 0.0722 (8.72) 0.0612 (4.61)
Social Sciences 0.0584 (4.23) 0.0262 (2.94)
Humanities & Arts -0.0696 (8.19) -0.0646 (3.45)
Education -0.0367 (6.18) -0.0303 (1.97)
Other Subjects       
Education Masters -0.0050 (0.38) -0.0165 (0.90)
Ref is doctorate Other Postgraduate -0.1211 (6.99) -0.1365 (7.01)
Degree -0.0721 (6.01) -0.0893 (5.17)
Academics (Higher Education) -0.0705 (3.90) 0.0054 (0.74)
Academics (Further Education) -0.1131 (5.15) -0.0120 (0.61)
Teachers (Secondary) -0.0579 (5.05) 0.0187 (1.32)
Dental Practitioners 0.4404 (6.64) 0.5036 (7.10)
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Doctors 0.1646 (7.15) 0.2649 (10.88)
Pharmacists & Pharmacologists 0.0716 (1.82) 0.2269 (7.45)
Accountants 0.1210 (7.18) 0.2615 (10.65)
Solic & Lawyers, Judges & Coroners 0.1314 (5.85) 0.2719 (11.75)
Consultants 0.2358 (10.47) 0.2536 (8.94)
Engineers -0.0031 (0.33) 0.0876 (3.32)
Public/Private Public -0.0479 (7.17) -0.0332 (5.07)
Constant 1.9917 (58.43) 1.9189 (26.35)
Regional dummies YES YES
Year dummies YES YES
Quarter dummies YES YES
No. Obs 28,325 22,463
R2 0.218 0.184
Source and notes: See Table 3.
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Table 6:
The wage premium associated with being a HE academic and other professions by age group
(i)    (ii)                  (iii)
Dependent variable: ln(wages per hour)        Graduates        Graduates        Graduates
Cohort             30-39             40-49                50+
Demographics
Sex Female -0.0661 (8.64) -0.1382 (15.97) -0.1708 (14.33)
Ethnicity Mixed Race -0.1614 (5.36) -0.1391 (3.70) -0.1774 (2.29)
Ref: white Asian or Asian British -0.1169 (5.60) -0.1513 (4.73) -0.1696 (3.71)
Chinese -0.0979 (1.94) -0.1604 (2.39) -0.4176 (7.68)
Black or Black British -0.1019 (3.04) -0.0953 (2.06) -0.0827 (1.28)
Other Ethnic Group -0.2498 (4.89) -0.1506 (2.14) 0.0040 (0.20)
Marital Status Unmarried -0.0045 (0.24) 0.0533 (5.95) 0.0551 (1.06)
Degree Medicine -0.0070 (0.56) 0.0531 (1.39) 0.0389 (1.03)
Subject Biology-Agriculture-Phisics 0.0668 (0.74) 0.0295 (0.87) 0.0216 (0.39)
Ref: unclassifed Maths-Engineering-Architecture 0.0637 (2.98) 0.0773 (2.18) 0.0687 (2.52)
degrees Social Sciences 0.0218 (1.87) 0.0394 (1.12) 0.0512 (2.50)
Humanities & Arts -0.0719 (3.42) -0.0424 (1.18) -0.0781 (1.58)
Education -0.0229 (1.22) -0.0258 (0.73) -0.0239 (0.41)
Education Masters -0.0099 (0.56) -0.0040 (0.22) -0.0184 (0.84)
Ref: doctorate Other Postgraduate -0.1377 (6.56) -0.1369 (6.47) -0.1278 (3.63)
Degree -0.0728 (4.53) -0.0786 (4.58) -0.0929 (3.99)
Academics (Higher Education) -0.0828 (3.53) -0.0268 (1.21) -0.0527 (2.19)
Academics (Further Education) -0.0662 (2.41) -0.0763 (3.43) -0.0714 (2.38)
Teachers (Secondary) 0.0050 (0.35) -0.0429 (3.70) -0.0630 (2.50)
Accountants 0.1444 (6.73) 0.1818 (5.14) 0.1594 (2.02)
Solic & Lawyers, Judges & Coroners 0.1826 (7.32) 0.2758 (5.88) 0.2710 (4.31)
Consultants 0.2308 (8.30) 0.2420 (6.62) 0.2472 (2.80)
Engineers 0.0006 (0.04) -0.0118 (0.62) 0.0261 (0.81)
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Doctors 0.2261 (8.01) 0.3219 (11.01) 0.3186 (6.56)
Pharmacists & Pharmacologists 0.1466 (3.40) 0.1187 (2.85) 0.1874 (2.49)
Dental Practitioners 0.5483 (6.18) 0.5371 (4.83) 0.4363 (6.41)
Public/Private Public -0.0840 (8.64) -0.0691 (7.37) 0.0146 (1.16)
Constant 2.2921 (52.55) 2.1933 (43.94) 2.3662 (29.94)
Regional dummies YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES
Quarter dummies YES YES YES
No. obs 16,822 11,922 6,972
R2 0.157 0.175 0.147
Source and notes: See Table 3.
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Table 7
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for the full sample
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Summary of decomposition results (as %) Graduates vs. 
HE academics
Graduates vs. 
secondary school 
teachers
Graduates vs. 
doctors
Doctors vs. 
HE 
academics
Amount attributable:            -11.9 6.1 -48.4 36.5
due to endowments (E):      -6.6 7.5 -3.3 7.2
due to coefficients (C):    -5.2 -1.4 -45.1 29.3
Shift coefficient (U):       8.8 3.4 28.7 -19.9
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}:   -3.1 9.5 -19.7 16.6
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: 3.6 2 -16.4 9.4
Endowments as % total (E/R):    214.9 79.4 17.0 43.5
Residual as % total (D/R): -114.9 20.6 83.0 56.5
Note: These Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are derived from regressions as shown in Table 4.
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Table 8
Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions for Women
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv)
Summary of decomposition 
results (as %)
Graduates vs. HE 
academics
Graduates vs. secondary 
school teachers
Graduates vs. 
doctors
Doctors 
vs. HE 
academics
Amount attributable:            -27.5 -12.8 -49.6 22.1
due to endowments (E):      -7.7 2.6 -5.5 1.2
due to coefficients (C):    -19.8 -15.4 -44.1 20.9
Shift coefficient (U):       21.3 14.7 22.8 -1.5
Raw differential (R) {E+C+U}:   -6.2 1.9 -26.8 20.6
Adjusted differential (D) {C+U}: 1.5 -0.7 -21.3 19.4
Endowments as % total (E/R):    124.3 138 20.5 5.8
Residual as % total (D/R): -24.3 -38 79.5 94.2
 Note: These Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions are derived from regressions as shown in Table 5.
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